The USPTO\u27s Soft Power: Who Needs Chevron Deference by Golden, John M
SMU Law Review
Volume 66 | Issue 3 Article 3
2013
The USPTO's Soft Power: Who Needs Chevron
Deference
John M. Golden
The University of Texas at Austin School of Law, jgolden@law.utexas.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
John M. Golden, The USPTO's Soft Power: Who Needs Chevron Deference, 66 SMU L. Rev. 541 (2013)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol66/iss3/3
THE USPTO's Sovr POWER: WHO
NEEDS CHEVRON DEFERENCE?
John M. Golden*
I. INTRODUCTIONB y many measures, the United States Patent and Trademark Of-
fice (USPTO) is no bureaucratic bantam. The USPTO compares
well in size and budget to the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC), which is commonly recognized to be a "powerful"' and
"respected" 2 federal agency. In fiscal year 2012, the USPTO employed
over 11,000 people, including nearly 8,000 patent examiners,3 and had
about $2.3 billion in program costs.4 In that same fiscal year, the SEC had
less than four-thousand full-time employees5 and program costs of about
$1.2 billion, a little over half those of the USPTO. 6 In terms of employ-
ment and budgetary measures, one might say that the 2012 USPTO was
about double the agency the SEC was.
Nonetheless, in terms of recognized power to speak on substantive
questions of law, the USPTO can seem an institutional mite. Like many
* Professor in Law, The University of Texas at Austin. For helpful discussions, I
thank Oren Bracha, Arti Rai, Matt Spitzer, and participants in the SMU Dedman School
of Law's 10th Annual Symposium on Emerging Intellectual Property Issues. I thank Grace
Matthews for research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Neal L. Wolkoff & Jason B. Werner, The History of Regulation of Clear-
ing in the Securities and Futures Markets, and Its Impact on Competition, 30 REV. BANKING
& FIN. L. 313, 380 (2010) ("For the securities industry, from the very beginning the exis-
tence of an independent federal regulator, the SEC, gave the markets the protection of a
powerful governmental agency with a clear mandate."); Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation
for Mass Private Delicts: Evolving Roles of Administrative, Criminal, and Tort Law, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 951 (listing the SEC as one of a number of "powerful agencies").
2. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities
Regulation, 28 CARDOzo L. REV. 333, 369 n.167 (2006) (describing the SEC as "re-
main[ing] one of the most respected federal agencies"); Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy and
Corporate Law: The Case for Regulatory Redundancy, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1273, 1325
(2009) ("[T]he SEC long enjoyed a reputation as one of the most respected federal
agencies.").
3. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY RE-
PORT: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 10 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 USPTO PERFORMANCE REPORT]
("At the end of FY 2012, the USPTO work force ... was composed of 11,531 federal
employees (including 7,935 patent examiners and 386 trademark examining attorneys).").
4. Id. at 74 ("Program costs totaled $2,321.0 million for the year ended September 30,
2012 . . . .").
5. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, FISCAL YEAR 2012 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 9
[hereinafter 2012 SEC FIN. REPORT] ("In fiscal year (FY) 2012, the [SEC] employed 3,785
full-time equivalents (FTE), including 3,754 permanent and 31 temporary FTEs."), availa-
ble at http://www.sec.gov/about/secafr2012.shtml.
6. Id. at 34 ("Total Program Costs were $1,198 million for the year ended September
30, 2012 . . . .").
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other administrative agencies, the SEC can receive high-level Chevron
deference when the courts review its interpretations of the statutes it ad-
ministers.7 In contrast, courts view the USPTO as lacking any general
grant of so-called "substantive rulemaking authority" and, thus, as gener-
ally not meriting high-level deference for its interpretations of substantive
aspects of the Patent Act.8
A number of commentators have criticized this distinctive aspect of
U.S. patent law's institutional structure and called for Congress or the
courts to act to recognize the USPTO as having greater authority to
speak with the force of law. 9 I myself have contributed to laments about
limitations on the USPTO's authority'o and have argued that the USPTO
should have substantive rulemaking authority for questions of subject-
matter eligibility, a class of issues relating to patentability."
But I now confess to having seen a greater light. For the most part,
need we care that much about whether the USPTO gets Chevron defer-
ence? True, Chevron deference enables an agency to effectively trump
prior interpretations of statutes by courts or the agency itself.12 This as-
pect of a Chevron deference framework can be important where prob-
lematic precedent could otherwise prevent an agency from moving
toward a more socially optimal way of resolving certain legal questions,
as might be the case for issues of subject-matter eligibility in patent law.13
7. See, e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819-20 (2002) (stating that an SEC inter-
pretation of "ambiguous text" was "entitled to deference if it [was] reasonable"); Fin. Plan-
ning Ass'n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (applying the Chevron deference
framework to an SEC rule excepting some broker-dealers from the reach of the Invest-
ment Advisers Act); McConville v. SEC, 465 F.3d 780, 786 (7th Cir. 2006) ("As a congres-
sionally authorized administrative agency, the Commission's interpretation of the
Securities Exchange Act will be upheld, unless the interpretation is contrary to clear con-
gressional intent.").
8. See infra text accompanying notes 26-34.
9. See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1747,
1806 (2011) (advocating "granting the PTO substantive rule-making authority"); Jonathan
S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 Sup. CT. REV. 275, 279 (arguing "for Congress to endow
the PTO with substantive rule-making authority"); Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing
Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1959,
2018 (2013) (contending "that both expertise and the avoidance of capture support the
Federal Circuit granting Chevron deference to the PTO"). But cf. Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 769, 793 (2004) (suggesting that before Congress gives the USPTO substan-
tive rulemaking authority, "it would need to dramatically restructure" the USPTO to make
it more competent to wield that authority).
10. John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as "Prime Percolator": A Prescription for
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 701 (2009) (sug-
gesting that a risk of ossification in patent law "is aggravated by patent law's lack of an
administrative agency having substantive rulemaking power").
11. John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEx. L.
REV. 1041, 1054 (2011) (arguing that "Congress should give the USPTO primary interpre-
tive authority for questions of subject-matter eligibility").
12. See infra text accompanying notes 38-43.
13. See Golden, supra note 11, at 1085 ("[Plresent-day U.S. courts tend to handcuff
themselves to ways of approaching subject-matter eligibility that are unlikely to produce
optimal social results.").
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But agency or judicial precedent commonly leaves much room even for
an agency not entitled to Chevron deference to shape courts' later under-
standing of the laws. History suggests that Chevron deference is not
needed for administrative agencies to be effective. Even in the wake of
the New Deal, U.S. administrative agencies operated for decades before
courts fully awakened to the Chevron principle, which Tom Merrill has
characterized as sparking something of an accidental revolution in the
law. 14 Moreover, through the adoption of guidelines such as those on the
patentability requirements of utility and adequate written description, the
USPTO itself has demonstrated a capacity to influence the development
of substantive patent law when it has the will to do so. 15 Likewise, the
Federal Trade Commission, an independent agency without any plausible
claim to relevant interpretive authority with respect to U.S. patent law,
has shown a capacity to influence patent law's development.16
In light of the above, this Essay argues that, even without access to
Chevron deference, the USPTO can act to significantly shape the course
of patent law's substantive development. Instead of spilling more ink on
what additional powers the USPTO should or could have, commentators
and policymakers might better spend their time analyzing what the
USPTO should do with the power it already has. Who needs Chevron
deference? This rhetorical question overstates the point. But the bottom
line is that the USPTO can accomplish much to improve the workings of
patent law by using its existing fact-finding and non-binding rulemaking
powers.
II. PRIMER ON USPTO RULEMAKING POWERS AND LEVELS
OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE
A. A WORLD ALREADY RICH IN USPTO RULEMAKING
The USPTO already has the power to make rules, even rules on ques-
tions of "substantive patent law," such as whether a claimed invention is
nonobvious."7 Congress has explicitly authorized the USPTO to issue reg-
ulations "govern[ing] the conduct of proceedings in the Office."', Moreo-
ver, the USPTO is charged with the initial screening of patent
applications19-which today number in the hundreds of thousands per
14. Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental
Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 399, 402 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006)
(describing Chevron as "a decision that was considered routine by those who made it [but]
came to be regarded as one of potentially transformative significance").
15. See discussion infra Part III.B.
16. Golden, supra note 11, at 1098 ("[T]he FTC has shown a capacity to influence
patent-law developments by holding hearings and issuing reports.")
17. See infra text accompanying notes 18-29.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2012).
19. See 35 U.S.C. § 131 ("The [USPTO] Director shall cause an examination to be
made of the application . . .; and if on such examination it appears that the applicant is
entitled to a patent under the law, the Commissioner shall issue a patent therefore.")
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year.20 This task necessarily requires the USPTO to address patentability
questions, such as whether an invention is obvious over prior art21 -i.e.,
to provide answers to "substantive" questions of patent law. At the very
least, because the USPTO is constantly confronting new technologies in
making these determinations, USPTO personnel are continually having
to engage in some form of interpretation of various substantive aspects of
patent law-whether of statutory language itself, prior judicial precedents
interpreting or applying such language, or the USPTO's own prior deci-
sions and guidelines. The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
(MPEP), a several-hundred-page tome designed to provide instruction to
examiners and those who appear before them,22 is in large part a monu-
ment to the USPTO's inescapable involvement in substantive interpretive
activity and the demand, if not absolute need, for the USPTO to provide
guidelines-one form of rulemaking23-for its several thousand examin-
ers and the applicants and patent agents with whom these examiners in-
teract.24 Yet in many respects, even the voluminous MPEP is merely a
fragment, a shadow, of the mass of interpretive activity in which the
USPTO's thousands of employees are regularly involved.
In sum, the bare statement that the USPTO lacks substantive rulemak-
ing authority can be misleading. Inherent in a combination of the
USPTO's authority to decide questions of patentability and its duty to act
in accordance with general administrative law norms of consistency and
due process is an authority to develop policies, guidelines, and internal
agency precedent that operates on matters of substance and does so in
the nature of a "rule"" 25 in the somewhat oracular words of the Adminis-
20. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT Acrivrry: CALENDAR YEARS
1790 TO THE PRESENT 1 (Mar. 19, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. PATENT AcrivITy] (listing
542,815 utility patent applications for calendar year 2012 and 503, 582 for calendar year
2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h-counts.pdf.
21. See JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAw 45 (3d ed. 2009) ("The examiner's most
important and difficult task is to determine whether the invention, as recited by the claims
of the patent application, is new ('novel') and 'nonobvious."' (footnotes omitted)).
22. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PRO-
CEDURE 1 (9th rev. 8th ed. 2012) [hereinafter MPEP] (describing itself as "contain[ing]
instructions to examiners, as well as other material in the nature of information and inter-
pretation, and outlin[ing] the current procedures which the examiners are required or au-
thorized to follow," but "not hav[ing] the force of law"), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/mpep/index.htmi.
23. PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN & BYSE's ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES
AND COMMENTS 178 (11th ed. 2011) (noting that materials such as "staff manuals and
memoranda, advice letters, circulars, bulletins, press releases, and the like" are often re-
ferred to generally as 'guidance' documents or 'nonlegislative rules"').
24. MPEP, supra note 22, foreword ("This Manual is published to provide U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO) patent examiners, applicants, attorneys, agents, and rep-
resentatives of applicants with a reference work on the practices and procedures relative to
the prosecution of patent applications before the USPTO.").
25. Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 1992) ("All agencies
charged with enforcing and administering a statute have inherent authority to issue inter-
pretive rules informing the public of the procedures and standards [they] intend[] to apply
in exercising [their] discretion." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.2, at 306 (4th ed. 2002)
("Any agency has the inherent power to issue an interpretative rule, a policy statement, or
544 [Vol. 66
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trative Procedure Act, "the whole or a part of an agency statement of
general or particular applicability and future effect designed to imple-
ment, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization,
procedure, or practice requirements of an agency." 26 According to cur-
rent judicial precedent, 27 what the USPTO really lacks is the capacity to
issue binding substantive rules-i.e., so-called "legislative rules" on sub-
stantive questions of patent law that "carry[] the force of law" 2 8 and
would be presumptively binding both within the USPTO itself and exter-
nally upon courts charged with reviewing its actions.29
Some commentators have argued that Congress's 2011 adoption of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act30 (AIA) has effectively given the
USPTO the power to develop presumptively binding interpretations of
substantive patent law when the USPTO acts through certain forms of
administrative adjudication.31 Because the legislative history of the AIA
prominently featured the trouncing of a proposal to give the USPTO gen-
eral rulemaking authority and, presumably, accompanying primacy in in-
terpretive authority,32 I am skeptical that the AIA has worked such a sea
change through implicit, rather than express, provision. 33 Justice Scalia
a procedural rule to implement a statute it administers."); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 1004 (1992) (contending that "once
Congress has delegated authority to executive actors under law, the executive agencies
must determine what the law means, and need not await a further delegation of interpreta-
tive authority from Congress to do so"). But cf Jonathan R. Siegel, The REINS Act and the
Struggle to Control Agency Rulemaking, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEois. & PUB. POL'Y 131, 159 (2013)
(suggesting that Congress could explicitly abrogate otherwise inherent authority to issue
interpretive rules).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012) (defining the term "rule").
27. See infra text accompanying note 45.
28. HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOr, FEDERAL COURTS STANDARDS OF
REVIEW: APPELLATE COURT REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS AND AGENCY Ac-
TIONS 160 (2007).
29. See id. (discussing the difference between rules "reviewed under the Chevron
framework" and those subject to "the so-called 'Skidmore' standard of review"); see also
RICHARD J. PIERCE. JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKULL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PROCESS § 6.4.5, at 327 (5th ed. 2009) ("Any rule that has a significant, binding effect
on the substantive rights of parties will be characterized as a legislative rule.").
30. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
31. See Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations
for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1239 (2012) (contending that "to the extent
[USPTO guidelines on topics such as patentability] were to be implemented in a postgrant
review proceeding that resembled a formal adjudication, the strong form of deference
enunciated by the Court in [Chevron] and its progeny would be applicable"); Wasserman,
supra note 9, at 1965 ("This Article concludes that the AIA rejects over two hundred years
of court dominance in patent policy by anointing the PTO as the chief expositor of substan-
tive patent law standards.").
32. See Golden, supra note 11, at 1051-53 (discussing legislative efforts to bolster the
USPTO's rulemaking authority or perceptions of its scope); Rai, supra note 31, at 1280
(noting that "[t]he swift elimination of the expanded rulemaking-authority provision from
the 2007 predecessor to the AIA suggests that a move in this direction might not be politi-
cally feasible").
33. The AIA extended the USPTO's powers in a number of interesting, discrete ways
that suggest the agency is now poised to play a greater role in policymaking than before.
See Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 493 (2012)
("The freshly enacted Leahy-Smith America Invents Act .. . gives the USPTO opportuni-
ties to play a much larger role in policymaking than ever before."); Sarah Tran, Patent
2013] 545
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once wrote for eight members of the U.S. Supreme Court that Congress
"does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague
terms or ancillary provisions-it does not, one might say, hide elephants
in mouseholes." 3 4 In a legal regime for which Congress has designated a
single court of appeals with the task of clarifying and unifying the law,35 a
new grant of authority to the USPTO to effectively displace that court as
the primary means to those ends seems to me more "elephant" than
"mouse." 36 Thus, I doubt that courts will find that Congress has silently
endowed the USPTO with a primary interpretive authority that the
courts have long understood the USPTO to lack.3 7
B. CHEVRON DEFERENCE, SKIDMORE DEFERENCE, AND THEIR
APPLICABILITY TO THE USPTO
If the USPTO can and does issue rafts of "substance-related rules" an-
yway, why does this question about the extent of its substantive rulemak-
ing authority matter? Of course, this essay means to suggest that the
importance of this question can be overblown. Nonetheless, there is
something to the question. This section clarifies why.
The explanatory key is the doctrine of Chevron deference. This doc-
trine traces back to the U.S. Supreme Court's unanimous 1984 opinion in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.38 When
applicable, the doctrine calls for a high level of deference to federal agen-
Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 595, 613 (2012) ("[S]etting standards for patent proceed-
ings [such as derivation proceedings] and prioritizing technologies on the basis of their
national importance requires that the [USPTO] engage in complex, policy-based decisions
that may carry profound implications for inventors, patent law practitioners, and society at
large."). A more contestable claim by some commentators is that the AIA endowed the
USPTO with a much more general dose of binding rulemaking authority, at least when
exercised through the "backdoor" of relatively formal post-grant review proceedings. See,
e.g., Rai, supra note 31, at 1280 (suggesting that "the government could ask for Chevron
deference toward decisions made in postgrant review proceedings"); Wasserman, supra
note 9, at 1977-78 (contending "that an application of administrative law principles to the
new and modified postgrant review proceedings triggers Chevron deference for the PTO's
interpretation of ambiguous terms of the Patent Act announced during these
proceedings").
34. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001); see also Tafas v. Doll,
559 F.3d 1345, 1352 n.3 (Fed. Cir.) (agreeing with a prior Federal Circuit panel "that Con-
gress did not hide the 'elephant' of substantive rulemaking authority in the 'mousehole' of
§ 2(b)(2)(B)"), vacated, 328 F. App'x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam).
35. Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Software and Busi-
ness-Method Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 823, 877 (2003) ("Congress established the
Federal Circuit and gave it exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases, in order to
make patent law more uniform, clarify it where possible, and end the forum shopping that
had plagued patent litigation.").
36. In United States v. Mead Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "[it is fair to
assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law
when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fair-
ness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force." 533 U.S. 218,
230 (2001). Even if USPTO post-grant proceedings adequately embody such "a relatively
formal administrative procedure," however, the discussion in the text provides reason to
conclude that this assumption about Congress's intent does not apply. Id. at 230-31.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 52-54.
38. See generally 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
546 [Vol. 66
The USPTO's Soft Power
cies' interpretations of Congress's statutory language. 39 In particular, the
doctrine charges a court with upholding an agency's statutory interpreta-
tions not merely when the court agrees with that interpretation, but also
whenever the interpretation is reasonable and not "contrary to the
statute. "40
Moreover, Chevron deference has corollaries that reinforce its signifi-
cance. The courts putatively hold the power-and bear the responsibil-
ity-to "say what the law is.41 But Chevron generates-or, perhaps more
precisely, acknowledges-a world in which much authority to declare the
law lies with administrative agencies. Hence, the U.S. Supreme Court has
made clear that when Chevron deference is otherwise appropriate, courts
should defer even if an agency has previously championed a contrary in-
terpretation. 42 Likewise, except in specified circumstances, the existence
of otherwise binding judicial precedent is no barrier to Chevron defer-
ence for an agency interpretation that runs contrary to that precedent. 43
In short, capacity to obtain Chevron deference for statutory interpreta-
tions can be a far-from-trivial addition to an agency's bureaucratic quiver.
A further complication, however, is that an agency may have a capacity
to obtain Chevron deference for interpretations relating to some ques-
tions, but not others. The USPTO itself is not wholly bereft of interpre-
tive authority meriting Chevron deference. Prior to enactment of the
AIA, the Federal Circuit explicitly recognized that the USPTO's general
authority to issue regulations "govern[ing] the conduct of proceedings in
the Office" 44 means that the USPTO may issue rules on office procedure
that will have the force of law and, thus, should receive Chevron defer-
ence from the courts.45
39. See generally id.
40. EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 28, at 141 (listing questions relevant to analyzing
statutory interpretation under the Chevron framework); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843
(explaining how, under the Chevron approach, a court first determines whether a statute
"is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue" and then addresses "whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute").
41. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) ("To the
extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all rele-
vant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the
meaning of applicability of the terms of an agency action."); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2080 (1990) ("The idea that
courts, and not adminstrators, were responsible for discerning the meaning of statutes
seemed to win legislative endorsement through the enactment of the APA in 1946.").
42. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981
(2005) ("Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency's interpre-
tation under the Chevron framework.").
43. Id. at 982 ("A court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds
that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no
room for agency discretion.").
44. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2006).
45. Cooper Techs. Co. v. Dudas, 536 F.3d 1330, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Because the
Patent Office is specifically charged with administering statutory provisions relating to 'the
conduct of proceedings in the Office,' 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(A), we give Chevron deference
to its interpretations of those provisions.").
2013] 547
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What the Federal Circuit has held the USPTO lacks is the necessary
authority to receive Chevron deference for its interpretations of so-called
"substantive" issues, as opposed to a set of "procedural" issues. 46
Whatever the wisdom or detailed content of the resulting procedure-ver-
sus-substance distinction, the bottom line is that the USPTO does not-
and will not-receive Chevron deference for broad swaths of rules (or
potential rules) involving questions of patentability, such as nonobvious-
ness and subject-matter eligibility.47 A rule, for example, that generally
declares software to be an unpatentable "abstract idea" 48 even when em-
bodied in the electronic memory of a tangible object would seem to be an
interpretive rule on a matter of patent law substance-or a "substantive
interpretive rule"-for which the USPTO cannot expect to receive Chev-
ron deference.
If not Chevron's, what deference framework applies to judicial review
of a substantive interpretive rule issued by the USPTO? Generally speak-
ing, when the Chevron framework does not apply, courts are to give so-
called Skidmore deference to agency interpretations of statutory law that
are within the agency's peculiar sphere of action.49 Skidmore v. Swift &
Co. is a pre-APA decision in which the U.S. Supreme Court indicated
that, even when the courts have primary responsibility for statutory inter-
pretation, courts should give due weight to an agency's interpretation of a
statute for which it has unique administrative responsibility.50 On behalf
46. Id. at 1335 ("To comply with [35 U.S.C.] section 2(b)(2)(A), a Patent Office rule
must be 'procedural'-i.e., it must 'govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office."'); see
also Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that "the
broadest of the PTO's rulemaking powers . .. does NOT grant the Commissioner the au-
thority to issue substantive rules" and that "[t]hus, the rule of controlling deference set
forth in Chevron does not apply"). In Tafas v. Doll, a Federal Circuit panel grappled at
length with the problem of distinguishing procedural from non-procedural (i.e., substan-
tive) rules, with each of the three panel judges offering a distinct view of how or whether
this should be done. 559 F.3d 1345, 1356 (Fed. Cir.) (concluding that relevant USPTO rules
were merely procedural because, though they could change the way in which matter was
presented to the USPTO, they did "not, on their face, foreclose effective opportunity to
present patent applications for examination" (internal quotation marks omitted)), vacated,
328 F. App'x 658 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam). Sarah Tran has concluded that
these "inharmonious opinions ... highlight the chaos inherent in determining whether a
particular [USIPTO regulation is substantive or procedural, and provide poor guidance."
Sarah Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 80 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 831,
851 (2012).
47. Cf Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2118
(2013) (disagreeing with an argument "that the [US]PTO's past practice of awarding gene
patents is entitled to deference").
48. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) ("The Court's precedents provide
three specific exceptions to [35 U.S.C.] § 101's broad patent-eligibility principles: 'laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas."').
49. EDWARDs & ELLIorr, supra note 28 (indicating that either the Chevron deference
framework or the Skidmore deference framework applies to "an administrative action ...
within the area in which Congress has authorized an agency to act").
50. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137 (1944) (noting that although "Congress
did not utilize the services of an administrative agency ... to determine in the first instance
whether particular cases fall within or without the Act," "it did create the office of Admin-
istrator, impose upon him a variety of duties ... and put on him the duties of bringing
injunction actions to restrain violations").
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of a unanimous Court, Justice Jackson wrote:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Ad-
ministrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and in-
formed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort
for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the valid-
ity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronounce-
ments, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.51
In accordance with Justice Jackson's language, the Skidmore frame-
work can be understood as counseling that courts treat an agency's inter-
pretation as a form of evidence of statutory meaning, with the weight of
that evidence depending on a variety of circumstances. As opposed to the
uniformly heavy thumb that Chevron purports to provide in favor of
agency interpretations, Skidmore thus gives deference on a sliding scale.
There is a third potential deference framework that a court might ap-
ply: a zero-deference framework. A court might say that a rule of zero
deference applies in situations in which an agency has no particular claim
to expertise in administering or understanding a statute or other source of
law, such as generally applicable provisions of the Constitution or the
APA. 52 Because of the sliding-scale nature of Skidmore deference, how-
ever, the zero-deference framework might be characterized as merely an
endpoint of the Skidmore sliding scale-an analog of the point at which
rotating a dial to dim a light becomes equivalent to shutting the light off.
Indeed, some have suggested that Skidmore deference itself is, in real-
ity, a regime of zero deference, the contention being that, in light of Jus-
tice Jackson's language about the agency's "power to persuade,"
Skidmore simply directs a court to accept an agency's judgment when the
court is "persuade[d]" that the agency is right-a direction that sounds
consistent with nondeferential de novo review. 53 To me, this contention
seems a bit too clever: Justice Jackson's substantive point appears to be
that a court should hold itself open to being "persuaded" to credit the
understanding of an "expert" agency over the understanding that the
court would have come to otherwise. The Skidmore framework highlights
this point and suggests circumstances under which giving substantial
weight to agency opinions seems likely to be best.54 The Skidmore frame-
work thus appears reasonably characterized as a framework for providing
deference.
51. Id. at 140.
52. See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 146 (2010) ("De novo
review is appropriate when agencies are interpreting laws that they do not have a special
responsibility to administer, like the Constitution, the APA, or Title VII.").
53. See Jack M. Beerman, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron
Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 849 (2010)
("To some, Skidmore is no deference at all-the reviewing court goes along with the
agency when, all things considered, it agrees with the agency.").
54. See generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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In any event, at least among administrative agencies, the USPTO does
have a special claim to expertise with respect to much of the substance of
the Patent Act, in particular the patentability provisions the USPTO ap-
plies again and again both in post-grant proceedings and in pre-issuance
examination. With respect to these statutory provisions, the USPTO ap-
pears entitled to application of the Skidmore deference framework. The
Federal Circuit acknowledged as much in its 1996 opinion in Merck & Co.
v. Kessler.55 In that opinion, a circuit panel famously held that the
USPTO lacks "general substantive rulemaking power" and, conse-
quently, does not receive Chevron deference for its interpretations of
substantive patent law. 5 6 Less commonly noticed is what the circuit said
and cited immediately afterward:
Such deference as we owe to the PTO's interpretive "Final Determi-
nation" . . . thus arises, not from the rule of Chevron, but solely from,
inter alia, the thoroughness of its consideration and the validity of its
reasoning, i.e., its basic power to persuade if lacking power to con-
trol. See . . . Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).57
The Federal Circuit's citation and partial quotation of Skidmore make
clear that the Kessler panel believed that the Skidmore framework should
apply where the Chevron framework does not.5 8 Consistent with this
view, a judge in the District Court for the District of Columbia recently
followed Kessler in holding that Skidmore deference applies to USPTO
statutory interpretations relating to patent-term adjustments. 59 Likewise,
in a recent dissent, Judge Bryson of the Federal Circuit recognized that
the Skidmore deference framework applies to the USPTO's rules on
patentability. 60
In short, under current legal understandings, the USPTO generally
lacks a claim to Chevron deference on questions of substantive patent
55. See 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Although the Federal Circuit later declared that, with respect to interpretation of a
statutory provision on patent-term extensions, "Skidmore deference is not warranted be-
cause the PTO's interpretation is neither persuasive nor consistent," Photocure ASA v.
Kappos, 603 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("Even if some level of deference were owed
to the PTO's interpretation, neither Chevron nor Skidmore permits a court to defer to an
incorrect agency interpretation."), such reasoning comports with application of the Skid-
more deference framework to the extent that one understands the Federal Circuit as hav-
ing concluded that, in Photocure, arguments for giving the agency interpretation definitive
weight were so weak that the Skidmore dimmer control was effectively at zero.
59. Univ. of Mass. v. Kappos, 903 F. Supp. 2d 77, 84 (D.D.C. 2012) (concluding that
"the PTO's determination is not entitled to Chevron deference" but is "entitled to defer-
ence under Skidmore").
60. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing, how-
ever, that the particular USPTO position in question was "not entitled to significant
weight"), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). In the same case, another judge on the Federal
Circuit's three-judge panel, Judge Moore, acknowledged that "[w]hile the PTO lacks sub-
stantive rule making authority, it is not without expertise in this area." Id. at 1344 (Moore,J., concurring in part).
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law. On the other hand, courts should generally accord Skidmore defer-
ence to the USPTO's interpretive rules on patentability. Is that enough
for the USPTO to use rulemaking to significantly guide the development
of substantive patent law? Part III argues that the answer is yes.
III. NO NEED TO WAIT: RULEMAKING WITHOUT CHEVRON
Generalized fact-finding and rulemaking relating to core substantive
issues of patent law need not wait on the USPTO's obtaining Chevron
deference for statutory interpretations relating to these issues. Modern
administrative agencies engaged in robust rulemaking before the Chev-
ron revolution of the 1980s.61 The USPTO itself has already sporadically
demonstrated an ability to use rulemaking or a consistently implemented
policy to steer substantive patent law's development in important ways.
Although the USPTO's formal lack of substantive rulemaking authority
might sometimes leave it hemmed in by judicial precedents that limit its
capacity to advance the best possible version of a patent system, the
USPTO can still accomplish much with the rulemaking capacities it un-
doubtedly has.
A. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES ACTING PRE-CHEVRON
OR SANS CHEVRON
Although the heavy citation of Chevron in court opinions62 and the
protracted obsession of academic literature with the case 63 might cause
post-Chevron generations to have difficulty imagining a robust regulatory
state without it, such a world did in fact exist prior to 1984. Pre-Chevron
law on judicial review of agencies' statutory interpretations was appar-
ently "something of a hodge-podge" best understood as mostly fitting a
Skidmore-type mold: according to Tom Merrill, "the conventional wis-
dom was that [the law] required courts to assess agency interpretations
against multiple factors,"6 with deference potentially "rang[ing] over a
spectrum from 'great' to 'some' to 'little.'"65 Nonetheless, the pre-Chev-
61. See infra text accompanying notes 64-74.
62. See Merrill, supra note 14, at 399 (noting that, within just over two decades, Chev-
ron had already "been cited in over 7,000 cases, making it the most frequently cited case in
administrative law").
63. See Thomas W. Merrill, Justice Stevens and the Chevron Puzzle, 106 Nw. U. L.
REv. 551, 553 (2012) ("Chevron has been cited by 8009 articles included in the Westlaw
database.. . . Chevron's frequency of citation in law review articles puts it in roughly the
same league as Marbury v. Madison (8492) . . . ."); Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Envi-
ronment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability, 57
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 229 n.116 (1994) ("The loss of forests necessary to make the
paper to print all of the articles written on the proper standard of review in interpreting
statutes following [Chevron] might well have justified requiring the Supreme Court to issue
an environmental impact statement along with the opinion.").
64. Merrill, supra note 14, at 400.
65. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
972 (1992); see also Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing at All: The
Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (2013) (providing a more
structured "best account of pre-Chevron law" but generally viewing the level of deference
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ron world was a world that had robust regulation-in some people's view,
too much regulation. The New Deal, never mind the earlier Progressive
Era, predated Chevron by about a half-century. 66 The launch of the Great
Society, with its further dramatic expansion of regulation, predated Chev-
ron by about two decades, yet produced what some have described as an
"avalanche of economic and social legislation." 6 7 In the wake of Great
Society legislation but before Chevron, informal rulemaking blossomed
as an institutional mechanism for implementing regulatory policy68-one
that triggered a reconsideration and recalibration of judicial review that
yielded, among other things, Chevron itself.69 Thus, the fact that before
Chevron agencies were likely to receive only Skidmore-type deference for
their statutory interpretations apparently did not prevent issuance of a
horde of agency rules and decisions that significantly shaped the sub-
stance of a number of legal regimes.
Moreover, rulemaking and development of agency precedents through
adjudication continue to this day under circumstances in which Chevron
deference does not apply. In United States v. Mead Corp., the U.S. Su-
preme Court recognized that agencies legitimately engage in statutory in-
terpretation in "a great variety of ways," many of which will not garner
Chevron deference. 70 Indeed, empirical work by William Eskridge and
Lauren Baer indicates that "there has not been a Chevron 'revolution' at
provided under that account as subject to consideration of "a constellation of factors" un-
less "Congress has expressly entrusted the law-determination function to the agency"). See
generally Sunstein, supra note 41, at 2082 ("Before 1984, the law ... reflected a puzzling
and relatively ad hoc set of doctrines about when courts should defer to administrative
interpretations of law.").
66. KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
18 (2010).
67. Id. at 21 (describing the decade after the launch of the Great Society as a period of
"regulatory and administrative expansion"); see also STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND
REFORM 3 (1982) ("Beginning in the mid-1960s the number of federal regulatory agencies
and the scope of regulatory activity vastly expanded.").
68. BREYER, supra note 67, at 3 ("The number of pages of federal regulations in the
federal register grew from 2,599 in 1936 to 65,603 in 1977, with the number tripling during
the 1970s."); see also Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the
Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. Or. REV. 345, 377 (observing that "by the mid-1970s vast num-
bers of issues of the sort which in 1946 would have been resolved in a formal adjudicatory
context before the agency, or even in an adjudicatory judicial proceeding, were being re-
solved in informal rulemaking and informal adjudication"); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Story of
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.: Law, Science and Politics in the Administrative State, in ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw STORIES 335, 340-41 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) (describing a focus on policymaking
through rulemaking, rather than adjudication, as "the most significant legal innovation of
the new [1960s-1970s] era of regulation").
69. See Merrill, supra note 14, at 412 (noting that Chevron came to the U.S. Supreme
Court in the midst of a "large controversy then brewing in Washington about how review-
ing courts should respond to administrative deregulation orders," such as that at issue in
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983)); Gillian E. Metzger, The Story of Vermont Yankee: A Cautionary Tale of
Judicial Review and Nuclear Waste, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAw STORIES 125, 126 (Peter L.
Strauss ed., 2006) (discussing debate over "the appropriate judicial response" to "bur-
geoning federal regulation at a time when public confidence in agency expertise and impar-
tiality was at low ebb").
70. 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001).
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the Supreme Court level," and that, in the Supreme Court at least, the
Chevron regime coexists with a variety of different deference
frameworks.71 A different empirical study performed by Kristin Hickman
and Matthew Krueger suggests that the framework that can be expected
to apply to USPTO rulemaking on substantive questions of patent law-
the Skidmore deference framework 72-iS far from meaningless: based on
"analysis of 106 identified Skidmore applications in the federal courts of
appeals," Hickman and Krueger concluded that courts applying Skidmore
are commonly "highly deferential," with the results of Skidmore review
being "weighted heavily in favor of government agencies." 73 In short,
there appears no good reason to believe that the lack of Chevron defer-
ence for rulemaking by the USPTO on substantive questions of patent
law should generally prevent the USPTO from investing in the develop-
ment of better substantive guidelines for its employees and those who
appear before them. Like other administrative agencies, the USPTO can,
and often should, act to formulate such rules even when, for purposes of
judicial review, those rules will lack the "force of law."
B. USPTO RULEMAKING SUCCESs WITHOUT CHEVRON DEFERENCE
There are already notable instances of situations in which the USPTO's
adoption of a policy, guideline, or practice on a controversial question of
substantive patent law has "succeeded" in the sense that courts-includ-
ing the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit- have upheld or embraced the USPTO's position as a
correct interpretation of statutory law. Perhaps most notably, the USPTO
has used interpretive rulemaking, in the form of guidelines for examiners,
to steer legal developments on applying patent law's utility and written-
description requirements.74
Patent law's utility requirement has typically been a fairly minimal
threshold for patentability. The utility requirement prevents the patenting
of apparently inoperable alleged inventions, such as "perpetual motion
machines,"75 but commonly does not achieve much more.76 Nonetheless,
71. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO.
L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 50-60.
73. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard, 107 CoLum. L. REv. 1235, 1280 (2007).
74. See Golden, supra note 11, at 1110 (noting that "the final versions of the USPTO's
utility and written-description guidelines have had substantial legal effect"); Rai, supra
note 31, at 1249-56 (discussing USPTO guidelines on utility and written description in
relation to the controversy over efforts to patent genetic sequences called "expressed se-
quence tags").
75. JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 333-34 (4th ed. 2013) ("If the utility asserted
for an invention contravenes generally accepted scientific principles, the USPTO will reject
the inventor's claims under 35 U.S.C. §101 as drawn to inoperable subject matter.").
76. See John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural
Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 128-29 (2001) (noting
that the utility "requirement has often been described as only demanding that a claimed
invention be minimally adept at doing what the patent application says it does"); ROBERT
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the USPTO injected new life into the utility requirement for biological-
substance and chemical-substance inventions by adopting 1999 interim
guidelines77 and 2001 final guidelines78 that used a decades-old Supreme
Court opinion to demand that such inventions "have a known utility that
is 'specific and substantial'-i.e., that is specific to the substance in ques-
tion and not a 'throw-away, insubstantial, or nonspecific utilit[y], such as
the use of a complex invention as landfill." 79 These guidelines helped
support rejections of claims for patent rights in genetic sequences called
"expressed sequence tags" (ESTs).80 ESTs are typically relatively short
sequences of genetic material8 that, because of inherent properties of
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA),82 quite generically might be used to detect
or otherwise bond with complementary sequences of genetic material.83
Thus, an EST might always be claimed to have some "utility" even before
more "specific and substantial" functions for the EST, such as helping to
identify a propensity for contracting a particular disease, have been
identified.
The USPTO's efforts to develop and implement the 2001 utility guide-
lines bore jurisprudential fruit. When the Federal Circuit decided In re
Fisher in 2005, a divided panel upheld the USPTO's utility guidelines and
their application to reject claims to ESTs.84 The opinion for the panel
PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD Durry, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 211 (5th ed. 2011) ("The vast majority of patent applications are processed
without the PTO raising any question as to utility, and the utility doctrine is also rarely
litigated as a defense in infringement actions.").
77. Revised Utility Examination Guidelines; Request for Comments, 64 Fed. Reg.
71,440, 71,440 (Dec. 21, 1999) (providing and requesting comments on "a revised version of
guidelines to be used by Office personnel in their review of patent applications for compli-
ance with the utility requirement").
78. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001) (providing
"a revised version of guidelines to be used by Office personnel in their review of patent
applications for compliance with the 'utility' requirement of 35 U.S.C. 101").
79. Golden, supra note 11, at 1050 (some internal quotation marks omitted).
80. See id. at 1050-51 (describing the USPTO's response to efforts to patent ESTs);
Rai, supra note 31, at 1249-56 (same).
81. Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in Genes and
Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 IOWA L. REv.
735, 748 (2000) ("An expressed sequence tag is a length of [a form of DNA] that is gener-
ally only a partial sequence of a gene being expressed at the time a specific tissue is sam-
pled." (emphasis omitted)).
82. See Samantak Ghosh, Gene Patents: Balancing the Myriad Issues Concerning the
Patenting of Natural Products, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 241, 243, 256 (2012) (noting that
"the nucleotides of each strand [of a DNA double helix] pair[ I with a complementary
nucleotide of the other strand through weak hydrogen bonds" and that, "even if the termi-
nal hydroxyl and phosphate groups [of DNA molecules] were modified, the DNA se-
quences would still be useful for hybridizing with complementary sequences").
83. See Holman & Munzer, supra note 81, at 749 ("ESTs can be useful as tools in
isolating full-length genes, locating coding regions on genomic DNA, in identifying pat-
terns of expression in tissues . . . , and in other applications where unknown DNA frag-
ments can be used."). See generally Golden, supra note 11, at 1050 ("The late 1990s
generated a flood of applications for patent rights on 'expressed sequence tags' (ESTs),
fragments of DNA that . .. were generally known to hybridize with complementary DNA
sequences, but whose specific biological purpose and significance were often unknown.").
84. 421 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (upholding USPTO rejection of a claim "for
lack of utility under § 101 and lack of enablement under § 112").
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majority noted that although neither the MPEP-into which the guide-
lines had been incorporated-nor the guidelines themselves had the force
of law, the court could take judicial notice of their content.85 The court
concluded that "[t]he PTO's standards for assessing whether a claimed
invention has a specific and substantial utility comport with [the] court's
interpretation of the utility requirement of § 101."86 The court likewise
held that the USPTO's application of those standards to reject the claim
at issue was adequately justified under a deferential "substantial evi-
dence" standard of review.87
Although the Fisher panel made clear that it was applying a deferential
standard of review to what it considered to be fact-based aspects of the
USPTO's rulemaking and adjudication, the panel was notably coy about
the notion of deferring to the USPTO's more purely legal interpretation
of the nature of "utility" for purposes of U.S. patent law.88 On the other
hand, the Fisher panel did cite the circuit's earlier opinion in Enzo Bi-
ochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., a case in which a Federal Circuit panel did
more than merely admit to agreeing with USPTO guidelines relating to
application of a patentability requirement.89 In Enzo, the circuit took no-
tice of USPTO guidelines on how the written-description requirement ap-
plies to "functional descriptions of genetic material."90 The written-
description requirement for patentability demands that an applicant pro-
vide sufficient disclosure to "reasonably convey[ ] to those skilled in the
art" that the applicant "actually invented the invention claimed," rather
than something significantly narrower or substantially distinct. 91 In the
guidelines in question, the USPTO concluded that, despite some arguably
contraindicative Federal Circuit precedent, description of "functional
characteristics" of claimed genetic material might satisfy patent law's
written-description requirement if this description were "coupled with a
known or disclosed correlation between function and structure." 92 The
Enzo panel not only agreed with these guidelines, but also explicitly con-
fessed to being "persuaded by" them. 9 3 Moreover, the panel expressly
described itself as "adopt[ing] the PTO's applicable standard for deter-
mining compliance with the written description requirement." 9 4
Such "persuasion" of the Federal Circuit by USPTO guidelines should
not be viewed as anomalous. In the previously discussed 1996 opinion in
85. Id. at 1372 (discussing the guidelines and their incorporation in the MPEP).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1379 ("We conclude that substantial evidence supports the [USPTO] Board's
findings that each of the five claimed ESTs lacks[] a specific and substantial utility and that
they are not enabled.").
88. See id. at 1372 (noting the court's ability to take judicial notice of the USPTO's
guidelines but not discussing openly whether they should receive any particular weight).
89. See generally 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
90. Id. at 964.
91. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
92. Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, 1 1,
"Written Description" Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1106 (Jan. 5, 2001).




Merck & Co. v. Kessler,95 the Federal Circuit recognized that the Skid-
more deference framework, which invokes an agency's "power to per-
suade," applies even when the Chevron deference framework does not.96
Likewise, in a nonprecedential 2012 opinion in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis
Elizabeth LLC, the Federal Circuit reversed a district court's invalidation
of patent claims for lack of utility and, in so doing, suggested deference
was due the USPTO's guideline "instruct[ing] examiners to give pre-
sumptive weight to the utility for which human trials have been initi-
ated."97 The examiner had apparently acted in accordance with this
guideline, and the circuit stated: "In deciding whether additional informa-
tion is required for examination purposes, deference is owed to the 'qual-
ified agency presumed to have properly done its job." 98
At least in one instance, the U.S. Supreme Court has been more
straightforward than the Federal Circuit in suggesting that the USPTO
often deserves some degree of deference, albeit not necessarily decisive
deference, for its interpretations of the Patent Act. In J.E.M. Ag Supply,
Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., the Supreme Court confronted
the question of whether the most standard form of patents-utility pat-
ents-"may be issued for plants" or whether, instead, statutes specifically
designed to provide patent or patent-like protection for plants were "the
exclusive means of obtaining a federal statutory right to exclude others
from reproducing, selling, or using plants or plant varieties." 99 In holding
that the U.S. Patent Act authorizes utility patents for plants, the Court
cited both the USPTO's long-established practice of issuing such patents
and the "specific expertise" of the USPTO's Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences: 00
We also note that the PTO has assigned utility patents for plants for
at least 16 years and there has been no indication from either Con-
gress or agencies with expertise that such coverage is inconsistent
with the [Plant Variety Protection Act] or the [Plant Patent Act]. The
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, which has specific exper-
tise in issues of patent law, relied heavily on this Court's decision in
[Diamond v.] Chakrabarty['0 ] when it interpreted the subject matter
of [35 U.S.C.] § 101 to include plants. This highly visible decision has
led to the issuance of some 1,800 utility patents for plants. Moreover,
the PTO, which administers § 101 as well as the PPA, recognizes and
regularly issues utility patents for plants.102
95. 80 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 55-60.
97. 435 F. App'x 917, 924 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
98. Id. (quoting Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359
(Fed. Cir. 1984)).
99. 534 U.S. 124, 127 (2001).
100. The analogous modem body within the USPTO is the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board. Sapna Kumar, The Accidental Agency?, 65 FLA. L. REv. 229, 237 n.47 (2013)
("Note that the [Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences] has been restructured as the
Patent Trial and Appeal Board .....
101. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
102. JEM. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 144-45 (internal citation omitted).
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This passage from J.E.M. makes clear that the Supreme Court viewed
both the USPTO generally and its Board as having "expertise" and, in
this case, recognized a long-standing practice that placed weight behind
the USPTO's interpretive opinion. Although, in the later case of Associa-
tion for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 03 the Court effectively
reversed a longstanding USPTO practice of issuing patents on genetic se-
quences, the Court apparently did so because a variety of considerations
"weigh[ed] against deferring to the [US]PTO's determination."10 4 Thus,
the Court's more recent reasoning appears consistent with according
weight to USPTO interpretations while also viewing those interpretations
as far from presumptively binding.
The Court's emphasis on the long-standing nature of the USPTO's
view and the practical consequences attached thereby points to a further
advantage that the USPTO might often have in guiding U.S. patent law's
development: inertia. With the courts subject to Article III standing re-
quirements and with Congress tending to face considerable hurdles to
decisive legislative action, USPTO interpretations of substantive patent
law can stand for years before facing serious challenge. Inertia can there-
fore frequently work in the USPTO's favor. After the passage of time, a
court might be skeptical of a potentially disruptive change of course, par-
ticularly if there is well-established acquiescence of others to the
USPTO's interpretative practice. 05 Judge Moore's partial concurrence in
a Federal Circuit panel's take on Association for Molecular Pathology ap-
peared to follow this line of thinking; Judge Moore's reasoning went be-
yond conventional interest in other government actors' acquiescence in
an agency understanding and explicitly expressed concern with the "set-
tled expectations" of industry actors about the patentability of genetic
material.106 In this way, Judge Moore's opinion resonated with a prior
Supreme Court opinion that had criticized the Federal Circuit for
"ignor[ing]" Supreme Court "instruct[ion] that courts must be cautious
before adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of the in-
venting community." 07 Although, in Association for Molecular Pathol-
ogy, the Supreme Court added a qualifying admonition that "[c]oncerns
about reliance interests arising from [US]PTO determinations . .. are bet-
ter directed to Congress" than to the courts, 08 one might still conjecture
that, all else being equal, courts will commonly look to be cautious before
103. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
104. Id. at 2119.
105. See Golden, supra note 11, at 1087 ("When a court explores limiting subject-matter
eligibility after a lengthy period during which hundreds or even thousands of patents on
the relevant subject matter have issued, the societal deck might be stacked against a course
correction." (internal citation omitted)); Rai, supra note 31, at 1269 (noting that delay in
judicial decisionmaking "makes significant contraction of patentability [through court ac-
tion] difficult, even if a particular patent-issuance practice emerged without deliberation").
106. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303,
1344 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring in part), affd in part and rev'd in part sub
nom. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107.
107. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002).
108. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2119 n.7.
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disrupting long-settled USPTO interpretations. Indeed, Justice Jackson's
language in Skidmore might be understood to endorse the possibility of
according an interpretive edge to long-settled agency interpretations.109
Of course, a "first-mover advantage" for the USPTO might not always
work for the best. Submission to inertia tends only to be a good idea if
one is already headed in an at least approximately right direction at an
appropriate speed. In various circumstances, the USPTO might not steer
U.S. patent law so successfully. Regardless, what is crucial for purposes of
this Essay is that the USPTO's ability to exploit inertia to its advantage
provides yet another reason to believe that, even without the advantage
of Chevron deference, more systematic USPTO rulemaking can have a
significant effect on the shape of U.S. patent law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The USPTO's lack of substantive rulemaking authority and consequent
lack of Chevron deference on patentability issues might be a structural
flaw in our patent system.110 But we-and more particularly, the
USPTO-need not be hung up on this institutional quirk. Many power-
ful, modem agencies operated for years, even decades, without receiving
or probably anticipating receiving deference under the Chevron frame-
work, which emerged from the furnace of administrative law litigation
only in the mid-1980s.11 1 The USPTO's experience with utility and writ-
ten-description guidelines shows that the USPTO can successfully use
nonbinding rulemaking to provide a systematic response to certain pat-
entability problems.112 Although relatively low-level Skidmore deference
for USPTO interpretations of substantive patent law might be less than
ideal, in many circumstances, it can be enough." 3 Whether or not "the
patent system is in crisis," 114 there is certainly much work to do in im-
proving it and much, in particular, that the USPTO can do-Chevron or
no Chevron-by issuing interpretive rules.
109. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (indicating that the "consistency" of an agency's inter-
pretation weighs in its favor); see also supra text accompanying note 51.
110. See discussion supra Part III.B.
111. See discussion supra Part III.A.
112. See discussion supra Part III.B.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
114. See John M. Golden, Proliferating Patents and Patent Law's "Cost Disease", 51
Hous. L. REv. 455, 456 (2013) ("Since at least 1999, the exact words 'The patent system is
in crisis' have appeared so often in academic literature that they might be considered a
meme.").
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